The paper aims to overcome the critique of the naturalistic fallacy faced by Luciano Floridi's ethics of information. Floridi proposes patient-oriented, ontocentric macroethics as the informaional ethics for the era of information. His main argument attempts to expand moral status to all beings, which was originally confined to humans, claiming that all informational entities have an intrinsic moral value due to their existence, which entails that human beings, animals, plants, and even non-biological entities deserve moral respect. Floridi’s ethics of information has been criticized for committing the naturalistic fallacy. This is because, according to G.E. Moore, when moral propositions are derived from natural facts, or 'ought' is derived from 'is' as Floridi does, it necessarily commits a naturalistic fallacy. However, Floridi does not take this critique seriously and it seems to be a critical weakness of his theory. This paper attempts to reinforce Floridi's naturalism through sensibility theory advocated by John McDowell, in order to overcome the critique of the naturalistic fallacy, while also maintaining Floridi's naturalistic perspective. The sensibility theory argues that moral values are simultaneous combinations of external properties and subjective minds. The paper argues that agents, understood as conceptualized in sensibility theory, can not only epistemically but also ethically reconstruct the world through the levels of abstraction. In his argument, Floridi did not verify how the levels of abstraction method can make agents reconstruct the world ethically, which falls prey to the naturalistic error. The argument of this paper expands the role of the levels of abstraction for both epistemic and moral reconstruction, with sensibility theory helping to defend against the naturalistic error and strengthen Floridi's naturalism.