The main purpose of this paper is to explore moral realism and self-identity in the philosophies of Charles Taylor and Christine Korsgaard. Their perspectives stem from the recognition that questions about what is ‘good’ are inherent in human existence. Furthermore, they contextualize ethical inquiries in relation to the identity of the self, which immediately introduces challenges. If morality is interpreted in connection with individual identity, moral propositions inherently become relative. Divergent perceptions of the ‘good’ emerge among human agents as they express their selfidentity. The objective reality of ‘good’ becomes elusive and non-objective when considering the multitude of possible recognition pathways available to each agent. However, Taylor and Korsgaard reject this relativism. Instead, they argue that the status of goodness is absolute. This paper delves into how Taylor and Korsgaard navigate the intricacies of defining the ‘good.’ Two metaphysical perspectives regarding human perception of good things and personal identity are proposed. The views of Taylor and Korsgaard are then attributed to these perspectives, examining the limitations of each point of view and elucidating how one perspective has an advantage over the other.